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The role of habeas corpus in immigration law underwent two
major transformations from 1996 to 2005. In 1996, Congress changed
the process whereby a noncitizen could appeal an order that he be
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removed from the United States.' These 1996 statutory amendments,
as interpreted by the federal courts, including the Supreme Court in
its 2001 decision in INS v. St. Cyr, combined to shape habeas corpus
into a principal vehicle for federal court jurisdiction to review
immigration removal orders.
2
Then, in May 2005, the REAL ID Act became law as part of the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief.3 The new law seemed to
eliminate habeas corpus review of final removal orders by providing
that petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals be the
exclusive path into court.4 As a result, the REAL ID Act appeared
simply to return petitions for review to the role they had played
between 1961 and 1996, when a noncitizen could principally obtain
judicial review of a deportation order by filing a petition in the federal
courts of appeals. 5 On closer inspection, however, it is evident that
the REAL ID Act could not simply have returned petitions for review
to their pre-1996 status, for in the interim much had changed in the
administrative decision-making procedure that is itself the focus of
court review.
6
The REAL ID Act's changes raise questions about adjudicating
petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals. These questions
include not only the scope and standard of review, but also the
application of preclusion doctrines, the availability of stays of removal,
remedies, and other aspects of adjudicating such petitions. The Act
also raises the same questions regarding any habeas jurisdiction that
federal courts may retain since passage of the Act. Given these new
open questions, the federal courts' experience with immigration
habeas from 1996 to 2005-the REAL ID Act notwithstanding-is not
just a matter of historical interest.
This Article makes two central points. First, the federal courts'
experience with immigration habeas from 1996 to 2005 is best
analyzed in terms of four models of habeas corpus, as these models
elucidate the choices the courts have made on key issues. Second, this
experience, properly understood in light of these four models, should
I See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 423, 110 Stat. 1214, 1272 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(e) (1) (1997)) (repealed
1996) [hereinafter AEDPA]; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 to -612 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1242 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 109-02, 2005))
[hereinafter IIRIRA].
2 See, e.g., 533 U.S. 289, 298-300 (2001).
3 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 109-02, 2005)).
4 Id. § 106.
5 See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 89-108 and accompanying text.
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guide federal courts as they redefine their jurisdiction in immigration
cases in light of the REAL ID Act. Part I begins by sketching how
habeas corpus emerged as a principal path to the courthouse from
1996 to 2005. Part II presents the four basic models of habeas corpus
reflected in court decisions during this period. Part III analyzes how
the choice among models affects key features of immigration habeas.
Part IV explains the lessons that this decade of habeas corpus teaches
us about petitions for review and any surviving habeas jurisdiction
after the REAL ID Act of 2005.
I
THE DECADE OF IMMIGRATION HABEAS CORPUS, 1996-2005
Although a full history of court review in immigration cases is
beyond the scope of this Article, some background is necessary in or-
der both to understand the emergence of habeas corpus in deporta-
tion cases from 1996 to 2005 and to derive lessons from that period
that may be helpful in interpreting the REAL ID Act.
A. Before 1996
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 7 They must ordi-
narily trace their power to hear a case to a specific congressional au-
thorization. 8 Although general provisions for judicial review did not
appear in federal immigration statutes until 1961, 9 federal courts
nonetheless had long assumed jurisdiction in immigration cases be-
cause of the simple fact that physical restraint was inherently involved
in the removal of an unwilling noncitizen. 10 Classically, such physical
restraint-i.e., custody-has been the foundation for issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus, the "Great Writ," a remedy guaranteed in the
text of the Constitution."
Could noncitizens get to court without habeas before 1961? At
that time, habeas was understood to require that the noncitizen be in
7 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
8 See id.
9 See Act of September 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53 (for-
merly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1995)) (repealed 1996).
10 See, e.g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 388, 390 (1947); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 35 (1939); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 284 (1922); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915); Chin Yow v. United States, 208
U.S. 8, 12-13 (1908); United States v.Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1888); see also
Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1963, 1965-69 (2000). For background on court review generally, see THOMAS
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZEN-
sI-p: PROCESS AND POLICY 751-53 (5th ed. 2003).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Suspension Clause states: "The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva-
sion the public Safety may require it." Id.
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actual physical custody before he could petition for the writ. 12 Of
course, noncitizens had an interest in contesting orders against them
as soon as those orders issued, without waiting to be taken into physi-
cal custody. Neither the 1934 Declaratory Judgment Act 3 nor the
1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ,14 however, established fed-
eraljurisdiction to review such orders. This changed in 1955 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,15 which held that
the APA, in combination with the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA),' 16 authorized federal courts to review deportation orders
(to remove a noncitizen who had entered the United States) and to
provide declaratory and injunctive relief when warranted. 17 The
Court reached the same conclusion regarding exclusion orders (to
remove a noncitizen who had not entered the United States) the next
year in Brownell v. We Shung.18 As a result of these two decisions,
noncitizens could now contest deportation and exclusion orders with-
out first going to jail.
Congress feared, however, that the availability of judicial review
created by Pedreiro and We Shung would be abused to extend review
beyond reasonable bounds. 19 For this reason, in 1961 Congress en-
acted section 106 of the INA, the first statute specifically governing
review of exclusion and deportation orders.20 For exclusion cases, sec-
tion 106(b) reestablished habeas corpus as the exclusive means for
review.2' Habeas petitions were almost invariably filed in the federal
district courts, with appeal available in the courts of appeals and via
certiorari in the Supreme Court. For deportation, section 106(a) took
a wholly new approach. 22 Rather than return to the pre-1955 reliance
on habeas, Congress made the Hobbs Act 23 the "sole and exclusive
12 See United States ex rel. Marcello v. INS, 634 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[Iln
1961, when the amending act was passed, 'custody' for habeas purposes meant primarily
physical detention by the government.").
13 Pub. L. No. 343, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(2000)).
14 Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59
(2000)).
15 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
16 See Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1557 (2000)).
17 See Pedreiro, 349 U.S. at 52 ("Our holding is that there is a right of judicial review of
deportation orders other than by habeas corpus .... ).
18 352 U.S. 180, 184 (1956) ("We conclude that . . . exclusion orders may be chal-
lenged either by habeas corpus or by declaratory judgment action.").
19 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 87-1086, at 28-32 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2950, 2966-67.
20 See Act of September 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651 (formerly
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)) (repealed 1996).
21 See id., 75 Stat. at 653.
22 See id., 75 Stat. at 651-52.
23 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51 (2000).
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procedure" for judicial review of final deportation orders. 24 The
Hobbs Act-which governs review for several other administrative
agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission-moves
review out of the district courts and into the courts of appeals.
25
Section 106(a) (9)-later renumbered as (a) (10)-provided that
"any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may
obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings. '2 6 While
this provision appears to conflict with section 106(a)'s designation of
the Hobbs Act as the "sole and exclusive procedure" for reviewing de-
portation orders, courts adopted several different ways of limiting the
reach of section 106(a) (10), making habeas review of deportation
available only in narrow circumstances as a supplement to petitions
for review in the courts of appeals.
27
B. From AEDPA (1996) to St. Cyr (2001)
1. The 1996 Legislation
In April 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),28 which significantly amended the 1961
scheme. AEDPA erected bars to judicial review in certain types of im-
migration cases. 29 Especially significant was section 440(a) of AEDPA,
which provided that any final deportation order based on certain
criminal convictions "shall not be subject to review by any court."
30
This language appeared to say that if an immigration judge found a
noncitizen deportable for an enumerated crime, that noncitizen
could appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) but no fur-
ther-and in any event not to any court.
AEDPA's judicial review scheme was soon superseded by similar
provisions in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
24 See § 5, 75 Stat. at 651.
25 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51.
26 § 5, 75 Stat. at 652.
27 See Orozco v. INS, 911 F.2d 539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that an incarcerated
noncitizen may not compel the INS, through habeas, to provide immediate disposition of
deportation proceedings when the INS files a detainer, because filing the detainer does
not cause the noncitizen to come within the custody of the INS); United States ex rel.
Marcello v. INS, 634 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the issuance of a deporta-
tion order against a noncitizen does not place her in custody so as to entitle her to seek
habeas corpus relief in district court in lieu of review in the court of appeals); Sotelo Mon-
dragon v. Ilchert, 653 F.2d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that in a habeas review of a
deportation order the noncitizen may only challenge the propriety of the INS procedures
that resulted in the order, and that district courts may only review exclusion orders in
habeas when the noncitizen has exhausted all administrative remedies); see also THOMAS
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIRosI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS
AND POLICY 960-73 (3d ed. 1995).
28 AEDPA, supra note 1.
29 See id. §§ 423(a)-(b), 440(a), 110 Stat. at 1272-73, 1276-77.
30 Id. § 440(a), 110 Stat. at 1276-77.
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sibility Act (IIRIRA), which became law in September 1996.3 1
IIRIRA's judicial review scheme appeared in an entirely new section
242 of the INA, but it carried forward some of AEDPA's key features.
3 2
First, IIRIRA barred judicial review for most noncitizens who became
deportable because of criminal convictions.33 Reflecting the same
policy evident in section 440(a) of AEDPA, section 242(a) (2) (C) of
the INA provided: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law.... no
court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal
against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed [cer-
tain criminal offenses]."34 Like similar language in AEDPA, this ap-
peared to say that the BIA was the end of the process for many
noncitizens deportable due to criminal convictions.
A more basic feature of IIRIRA was its consolidation of what had
been "exclusion" and "deportation" proceedings into a single type of
proceeding called a "removal" proceeding.3 5 An order to leave the
United States became known simply as a "removal order."36 As part of
this consolidation, new section 242 of the INA then replaced what had
been separate systems ofjudicial review for exclusion and deportation
orders with a single scheme for judicial review of most removal or-
ders. 37 As a rule, review-if available at all-took place in the federal
courts of appeals under the Hobbs Act procedure that the 1961 Act
had applied to deportation orders.38 Under section 242(b), a nonci-
tizen could obtain court review of a final removal order by filing a
petition for review with the court of appeals for the circuit in which
the removal proceedings were completed. 39 Section 242(b) also set
out rules for service and shortened the filing deadline to thirty days
after a final removal order.
40
2. Immigration Habeas Before St. Cyr
Noncitizens whose court access appeared to be blocked by sec-
tion 440(a) of AEDPA challenged the judicial review bar using a vari-
ety of arguments, including the constitutional arguments that the bar
31 See IIRIRA, supra note 1.
32 See INA § 242(a) (2) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (C) (2000). Most provisions of sec-
tion 242 did not take effect immediately. In the interim, transition rules that were not
codified in the INA governed review. Although textual differences among AEDPA, the
transition rules, and section 242 led courts to construe them differently, they shared basic
themes including bars to judicial review in certain types of cases. See IIRIRA § 309(c) (4),
110 Stat. at 3009-626 to -627.
33 See id. § 306, 110 Stat. at 3009-607 to -608.
34 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (C).
35 See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
36 See IIRIRA § 309(d) (2).
37 See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
38 See id. § 1252(a)(1).
39 See id. § 1252(b) (2).
40 See id. § 1252(b)(1).
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violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the sep-
aration-of-powers principles embodied in Article III. 4 1 A number of
federal courts rejected such challenges, holding that section 440(a)
was consistent with both due process and separation of powers. 4 2
These decisions noted and sometimes expressly relied on the availabil-
ity of habeas corpus as an alternative to the now-foreclosed petition
for review in a court of appeals.43 In response, noncitizens with final
removal orders began to file habeas corpus petitions in federal district
courts. Two main questions emerged. First, did AEDPA and IIRIRA
leave habeas corpus intact to challenge a final removal order? Sec-
ond, what is the scope and standard of review, if and when a federal
district court sits in habeas to decide a challenge to a final removal
order?
On the first question, it was clear that AEDPA repealed habeas
jurisdiction under former section 106(a) (10) of the INA to review a
deportation ordcr.44 No language authorizing habeas jurisdiction
over removal orders appeared in new section 242 of the INA as en-
acted by IIRIRA. 4 5 The habeas corpus alternative in these cases was
therefore not the habeas jurisdiction that had existed under the INA
for review of exclusion and deportation orders. But neither AEDPA
nor IIRIRA mentioned the general habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, which says in pertinent part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge
within their respective jurisdictions.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States or
41 See, e.g., United States v. Herrera-Blanco, 232 F.3d 715, 716 (9th Cir. 2000) (due
process challenge); Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1997) (separation-of-pow-
ers challenge).
42 See, e.g., Herrera-Blanco, 232 F.3d at 717-18; Mansour, 123 F.3d at 426.
43 See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 790 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[A]lthough AEDPA has
repealed the previous statutory authorization for habeas review of final deportation orders
contained in section 106(a)(10) of the INA, any habeas review that is required by the
Constitution remains available."); see also Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352, 354 n. 1 (11 th
Cir. 1997) ("[T]he issue of whether section 440(a) (10) precludes judicial review of depor-
tation orders via a writ of habeas corpus is not presented on this appeal."); Duldulao v.
INS, 90 F.3d 396, 400 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The availability and scope of collateral habeas
review where the 'paramount law of the Constitution' may requirejudicial intervention was
not an issue before us, and we need not decide whether section 440(a) purports to pre-
clude it." (citation omitted)).
44 See AEDPA, supra note 1, § 401, 110 Stat. at 1268.
45 See IIRIRA, supra note 1.
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(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States .... 46
Could a noncitizen barred from filing a petition for review in the
court of appeals instead file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court under § 2241? After almost all of the circuit
courts of appeals had said that habeas jurisdiction did remain availa-
ble,47 the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in INS v. St. Cyr addressed
both the question of whether AEDPA and IIRIRA left habeas corpus
intact and the question of the scope and standard of review in immi-
gration habeas.
48
3. INS v. St. Cyr
Enrico St. Cyr was a Haitian citizen who became a permanent
resident of the United States in 1986, when he was about nineteen
years old.49 St. Cyr's brother was also a lawful immigrant; his parents
and sister were U.S. citizens. 50 Ten years later, St. Cyr pled guilty to
selling drugs. 51 Although this conviction made St. Cyr deportable,
52
he was eligible for a discretionary form of relief from deportation, and
he hoped to persuade an immigration judge to consider his ties to this
country and let him stay.53 St. Cyr applied for this relief in 1996,5 4 but
only after other parts of AEDPA had tightened the eligibility rules
(and before IIRIRA superseded AEDPA with a similarly restrictive
scheme).55 The new AEDPA rules would make him ineligible for dis-
cretionary relief because of the conviction, but did those new rules
apply? The immigration judge's answer, affirmed by the BIA, was that
46 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c) (West, Wesdaw through Pub. L. No. 109-102, 2005).
47 Compare Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the district court had jurisdiction over a noncitizen's habeas petition under § 2241);
Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Pak v. Reno, 196 F.3d
666, 673-74 (6th Cir. 1999) (same); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 489 (4th Cir. 1999)
(same); Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F.3d 299, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1999) (same);
Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Shah v.
Reno, 184 F.3d 719, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 238
(3d Cir. 1999) (same); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1998) (same), and
Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 133 (1st Cir. 1998) (same), with LaGuerre v. Reno, 164
F.3d 1035, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court did not have such habeas
jurisdiction).
48 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
49 Id. at 293.
50 St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. 289.
51 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
52 Id.; see also INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2000) (establishing de-
portability for crimes relating to controlled substances).
53 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293.
54 Id.
55 See AEDPA, supra note 1, § 440(d), 110 Stat. at 1277; IIRIRA, supra note 1.
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the new rules did apply and that St. Cyr was ineligible for discretionary
relief.
56
If St. Cyr had sought review on the ground that he was not de-
portable at all, he could have filed a petition for review in the court of
appeals. But once it was settled that his conviction made him deport-
able, the conviction triggered section 440(d) of AEDPA, which barred
him from filing a petition for review in the court of appeals on the
issue of whether he was eligible for discretionary relief.57 St. Cyr's
only possible vehicle for court review on that issue was the habeas peti-
tion that he filed in federal district court. While the substantive ques-
tion in St. Cyrwas whether the new eligibility rules applied to conduct
that predated the enactment of AEDPA, the Supreme Court faced a
threshold question: Did the district court sitting in habeas have juris-
diction to decide Enrico St. Cyr's eligibility?
58
The Court held five to four that AEDPA had left habeas corpus
jurisdiction intact, at least to decide a "pure question of law," such as
whether St. Cyr was eligible for relief.59 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Stevens stated that for the government to prevail in its argument
that AEDPA's reworking of judicial review repealed immigration
habeas, it would have to "overcome both the strong presumption in
favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding
rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal
habeas jurisdiction."60 He went on to note that "[i]mplications from
statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas
jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and unambigu-
ous statutory directives to effect a repeal.
'6 1
The Court then invoked two additional canons of statutory inter-
pretation, which, it said, reinforced the plain statement rule. First,
56 St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. 289.
57 AEDPA § 440(d); see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297 ("In 1996, in § 440(d) of AEDPA,
Congress identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions would preclude such
relief. And finally, that same year, Congress passed IIRIRA. That statute, inter alia, re-
pealed § 212(c) and replaced it with a new section that gives the Attorney General the
authority to cancel removal for a narrow class of inadmissible or deportable aliens. So
narrowed, that class does not include anyone previously 'convicted of any aggravated fel-
ony.' (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
58 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292.
59 Id. at 308.
60 Id. at 298 (footnote omitted) ("'We are not at liberty to except from [habeas
corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law.'" (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Ex parteYerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 102 (1869)); see Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
660-61 (1996) (noting that "[n]o provision of Title I mentions our authority to entertain
original habeas petitions," and the statute "makes no mention of our authority to hear
habeas petitions filed as original matters in this Court").
61 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (" 'Repeals by implication are not favored. They are seldom
admitted except on the ground of repugnancy; and never, we think, when the former act
can stand together with the new act.'" (quoting Yerger, 75 U.S. at 105)).
2006]
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the Court wrote: "[W]hen a particular interpretation of a statute in-
vokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication
that Congress intended that result."62 Next, the Court invoked the
canon of constitutional avoidance, explaining that "if an otherwise ac-
ceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is
'fairly possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such
problems." 63 The Court cited the Suspension Clause to draw support
for its position. The majority wrote: "A construction of the amend-
ments at issue that would entirely preclude review of a pure question
of law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional ques-
tions.... Because of [the Suspension] Clause, some 'judicial interven-
tion in deportation cases' is unquestionably 'required by the
Constitution.' "64
On the second key question-scope and standard of review-St.
Cyr decided that habeas jurisdiction as a historical matter, and there-
fore as a constitutional matter, encompassed review for "errors of law,
including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes."65
So defined, habeas jurisdiction included review for legal errors, at
least as to a "pure question of law" such as whether St. Cyr was eligible
for relief.66
The Court concluded its jurisdictional analysis by rejecting the
government's argument that four statutory provisions limiting judicial
review-one from AEDPA and three from IIRIRA-expressed "a clear
and unambiguous statement of Congress' intent to bar petitions
brought under § 2241 ."67 Key to the Court's reasoning was its obser-
vation that "[i]n the immigration context, 'judicial review' and
'habeas corpus' have historically distinct meanings." 6 (For this rea-
son, this Article uses the term "court review," which I intend to in-
clude both judicial review and habeas corpus review.)
Finally, the Court returned to the canon of constitutional
avoidance:
62 Id.
63 Id. at 299-300 (citation omitted) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 341, 345-48 (1936)) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62,
(1932); United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)). This was the second time in one week that the Court applied the avoidance ca-
non to reach a result favoring a noncitizen. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001);
see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Centu-y of Plenay Power: Phantom Constitu-
tional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (discussing the avoidance
canon in immigration law).
64 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300 (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)).
65 Id. at 302.
66 Id. at 308.
67 Id. at 308-14.
68 Id. at 311.
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If it were clear that the question of law could be answered in
another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept the INS'
reading of [INA § 242]. But the absence of such a forum, coupled
with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of con-
gressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of
such an important question of law, strongly counsels against adopt-
ing a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions.
Accordingly, we conclude that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was
not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA.
69
In short, St. Cyr confirmed that although many noncitizens sub-
ject to final removal orders could not obtain review of pivotal issues in
their cases by means of a petition for review in the courts of appeals,
they nevertheless could challenge final removal orders by raising ques-
tions of law in habeas petitions filed in the federal district courts.
70
II
FOUR MODELS OF IMMIGRATION HABEAS CORPUS
As soon as AEDPA became law, and especially since St. Cyr, fed-
eral courts have issued a vast number of decisions that together have
shaped the contours of habeas corpus jurisdiction in immigration
cases. This Part attempts to make sense of these decisions by viewing
them as a reflection of judges' implicit choices from among four
habeas corpus models: Two are what I call direct review models, and
two are collateral review models. Even though the REAL ID Act ap-
pears to have eliminated habeas review of final removal orders, these
models of immigration habeas are important for understanding the
choices that courts will face as they interpret the REAL ID Act.
A. Direct vs. Collateral Review
An explanation of these four proposed models of immigration
habeas must begin by addressing the basic distinction between collat-
eral and direct review. I start with an attempt to avoid confusion in
the use of these terms and in the notion of habeas corpus models. My
usage differs from what appears in other, non-immigration law con-
texts. In the criminal law context, a rich body of commentary assesses
various features of habeas corpus as a matter of preferred habeas
models, which are typically described in phrasing-such as "full-review
model," "appellate model," and 'jurisdiction-only model"-that sug-
gests placement on a spectrum from direct to collateral review.
7 1
69 Id. at 314 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
70 See, e.g., Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 349-51 (2001).
71 See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 DuKE L.J. 947, 983-1003 (2000);James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?:
The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997,
2006]
CORNELL LAW REVEW
Much of the evolution of habeas corpus in criminal cases can be un-
derstood as the gradual shift from the more direct end of the spec-
trum in the Warren Court's habeas decisions 72 toward the collateral
end of the spectrum in more recent years.
73
This Article similarly evaluates immigration habeas as a matter of
competing models, but the range of models is necessarily different.
In cases like St. Cyr, statutory bars to petitions for review in the courts
of appeals left immigration habeas as the only vehicle for courts to
examine the lawfulness of a noncitizen's removal from the United
States.74  Criminal habeas, however, exists alongside-and typically
comes into play after-a series of judicial proceedings at trial and ap-
pellate levels. For this reason, any characterizations of criminal
habeas models as "direct" or "collateral" must take into account that
criminal habeas exists alongside a system of criminal adjudication.
This means that criminal habeas-no matter how direct or collateral
it may seem within the criminal law context-is inherently more col-
lateral than any form of immigration habeas, even if habeas within the
immigration law context is sometimes called "collateral review. '75
According to a traditional definition, direct review refers to multi-
ple layers of review in the "same proceeding." 76 In an immigration
case, this would typically include review by the BIA and then subse-
quent review by some combination of federal courts. These layers are
typically defined by jurisdictional statutes and regulations that pro-
vide, for example, that the BIA hears appeals from removal orders
issued by immigration judges, 77 or that final removal orders may then
be reviewed by courts of appeals. 78 In contrast, collateral review pre-
2009-10 (1992); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 575, 582-87
(1993).
72 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
73 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
74 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300 ("Unlike the provisions of AEDPA that we construed in
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), this case involves an alien subject to a federal removal
order rather than a person confined pursuant to a state-court conviction.").
75 See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens,
98 COLUM. L. Rjv. 961, 984 (1998) ("[C]riminal convictions have not been absolutely im-
mune from collateral attack, and the reach of habeas corpus in reviewing them has ex-
panded over the years, while always remaining narrower than its reach in reviewing
executive detentions."); Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas
Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2543 (1998) ("In a fundamental
sense, federal habeas review of an administrative deportation order is not collateral at
all.").
76 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 862 (4th ed. 2003) ("Techni-
cally, federal court consideration of the habeas corpus petition is not considered a direct
review of the state court decision: rather, the petition constitutes a separate civil suit filed
in federal court and is termed collateral relief.").
77 See8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2005).




supposes that decision making, including multiple layers of direct re-
view by agencies and/or courts, is complete. Collateral review,
according to this understanding of the term, refers to a "separate pro-
ceeding" that reassesses some aspects of the first proceeding, includ-
ing its direct review stages.7 9 Collateral review is quite literally
extraordinary.
These definitions of direct and collateral review make some intui-
tive sense but are analytically limited. To say that direct review refers
to the multiple layers of review in the same proceeding only begs the
question: What is the "same proceeding"? To say that collateral review
presupposes the completion of decision making and refers to a sepa-
rate proceeding only begs the question: What is a "separate
proceeding"?
One way to distinguish same from separate is to consider the
boundaries between traditionally distinct systems of decision mak-
ing-for example, the boundaries between state and federal courts or
between courts and administrative agencies. The presence of state law
issues in most federal habeas petitions filed in criminal cases rein-
forces the prevailing sense that criminal habeas, even in its more di-
rect forms, is still collateral review because it is a creature of a distinct
government authority.80 However, this approach based on bounda-
ries between decision-making systems also has limited analytical
power. There are many counterexamples in which review crosses over
from one decision-making system to another and yet is commonly be-
lieved to be direct review, such as Supreme Court review of the deci-
sions of the highest court of a state and federal court review of the
final decision of a federal administrative agency.
Let me suggest a way to distinguish collateral from direct review
that may seem less precise but is ultimately more meaningful. I be-
lieve that two fundamental premises underlie what is typically under-
stood to be collateral review. The first premise is that confidence in
the outcome in a given case is open to doubt that differs in character
or exceeds in degree the doubt that forms the typical basis for direct
review. This altered confidence in the outcome might reflect concern
that prior procedures were less reliable than the procedures that
would apply upon collateral review. Or, this altered confidence might
reflect concern that the prior institutional context renders the out-
come suspect in a way that direct review might not correct but that
collateral review can.
The second fundamental premise underlying collateral review is
that the stakes in a given case may be high enough to call for a review
79 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76.




in addition to direct review. This premise explains why it seems natu-
ral to think of habeas corpus as providing for collateral review when it
permits federal judicial review of state criminal convictions. Especially
in death penalty cases, justice may demand reexamination of the first
proceeding even when reexamination is redundant and lack of confi-
dence in the first proceeding is insufficient to trigger the first funda-
mental premise.
Matters of confidence and stakes are largely matters of degree.
My suggestion for distinguishing direct from collateral review must ac-
knowledge a large gray area on the spectrum from direct to collateral
review. This gray area-which is also elusive because the direct-to-col-
lateral spectrum itself differs in immigration law and criminal law 1-
includes many cases that might reasonably be classified as direct or
collateral within the context of immigration law or criminal law. Not-
withstanding this imprecision, it seems clear that collateral review re-
sponds to a different set of doubts about the original outcome than
the doubts typically addressed by direct review. These different
doubts lead to a collateral review scheme whose key features differ
from direct review schemes.
Put in general terms, collateral review involves certain costs. It
weakens finality by undercutting repose and by questioning the au-
thority of another government decision maker, and it adds to the judi-
cial workload and thus imposes institutional and fiscal costs. 82 To
conserve resources, the exercise of collateral review is quite limited as
compared to the volume of potentially reviewable decisions. 83 Collat-
eral review applies both more narrowly and more deeply than direct
review-it is narrower in that it applies less often, but it is deeper in
that it reexamines prior decisions in ways that direct review typically
leaves untouched.
B. Direct Review Models
My two direct review models cast habeas corpus as a layer of ap-
peal from an immigration judge's removal order. Such an order typi-
cally reflects three findings by an immigration judge: (1) that the
individual is not a U.S. citizen; (2) that she either has not been admit-
81 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
82 On the need for finality in criminal habeas, see Paul M. Bator, The Slate Courts and
Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wi. & MARY L. REv. 605, 614-15 (1981). On finality as
the basis of preclusion doctrines in civil actions, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACnONS 11-18 (2001).
83 On this point in the criminal habeas context, see Bator, supra note 82, at 635-36;
Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1457, 1473 n.88, 1474




ted to the United States and is inadmissible,8 4 or has been admitted
and is deportable;85 and (3) that she either is ineligible for discretion-
ary relief or is eligible but denied such relief.s 6 These two models cast
habeas corpus as reviewing such immigration judges' findings by sub-
stituting for either (1) a federal court of appeals or (2) the BIA.
In the first direct review model, habeas review in federal district
court is a surrogate for the court of appeals review that was eliminated
by the judicial review bars in AEDPA8 7 and IIRIRA.88 This model
takes seriously the idea that immigration habeas is different from
criminal habeas, in that immigration habeas is the first and only
chance for courts to examine the lawfulness of removing certain
noncitizens. Accordingly, the scope and standard of review and other
procedural aspects in immigration habeas should resemble-even if
they do not equal-the scope and standard of review and other proce-
dural aspects of petitions for review in the courts of appeals.
In the other, less obvious direct review model, habeas review in
federal district court is a surrogate for the BIA itself. The factual pred-
icate for this model is the restructuring of the BIA since 1999. As
background, the BIA has been part of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) since 1940.89 Within the DOJ, the BIA and all immigration
judges have been part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) since 1983, when restructuring made the BIA and the immi-
gration judges directly accountable to the Attorney General under a
chain of command separate from the Attorney General's authority
over the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).9 ° In 2002,
the Homeland Security Act broke up the INS and transferred most of
its components to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
but the EOIR stayed within the DOJ. 91
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the BIA caseload grew stead-
ily-the BIA heard 3630 cases in 1983, 8204 cases in 1987, 12,774
cases in 1992, 30,000 cases in 1997, and over 34,000 cases in 2002.92
84 See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (defining "classes of aliens
ineligible for visas or admission").
85 See INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (defining "classes of deportable aliens").
86 See, e.g., INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (cancellation of removal for certain
permanent residents).
87 AEDPA, supra note 1.
88 IIRIRA, supra note 1.
89 ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 10, at 251-52.
90 See 48 Fed. Reg. 8,038 (Feb. 25, 1983) (codified at 8 C.F.R. 3.0-1); see also Anna
Marie Gallagher, Practice and Procedure Before the Board of Immigration Appeals: An Update,
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (Feb. 2003).
91 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
92 See ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 10, at 252; EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE FY 2003, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at S2 (2004);
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK
2001, at El (2002).
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One response from the DOJ was to expand the BIA. The BIA started
with five permanent members,9 3 who heard all cases en banc, al-
though with oral argument in only very few. In 1988, Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese started the steady expansion of the BIA to twenty-
three permanent members. 94 The BIA also came to decide most cases
not en banc but in three-member panels.
95
When even these changes could not keep up with the rising
caseload, the BIA responded in November 1999 with new streamlining
regulations that allowed a single BIA member to issue an affirmance,
without opinion, of the appealed decision if that member found "that
the result reached in the decision under review was correct [and] that
any errors in the decision under review were harmless or
nonmaterial."9 6
This streamlining allowed the BIA to significantly increase its out-
put and reduce its backlog, but Attorney General John Ashcroft, who
took office in 2001, found the progress unsatisfactory.9 7 Regulations
adopted in August 2002 made disposition of appeals by a single BIA
member the norm.98 A three-member panel hears a case only if it falls
into one of six narrow categories spelled out in the regulations.9 9 Sin-
gle members may affirm with or without opinion and may also dispose
of appeals on procedural grounds. 10 0 The regulations also impose
presumptive time limits on BIA decisions and revise the standard of
review to require greater deference to an immigration judge's find-
ings of fact.1 0 ' Following these procedures, the BIA boosted its output
93 See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (a)(1) (2001); ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 10, at
252.
94 See8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1) (2002).
95 See 53 Fed. Reg. 15,659 (May 3, 1988) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1)) ("This
provision is necessary because it has become apparent that periodic substantial increases in
the Board case load have created a need for additional members to assist in the efficient
review of cases. This rule will effectively increase the Board's capacity to review cases since
it will be possible to create two panels of three members, each one capable of reviewing
cases.").
96 See 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,141 (Oct. 18, 1999). For additional information regard-
ing BIA streamlining, see also ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN & MOTOMURA, supra note 10, at 251-53.
97 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Unveils Administra-
tive Rule Change to Board of Immigration Appeals in Order To Eliminate Massive Backlog
of More Than 56,000 Cases (Feb. 6, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2002/February/02_ag_063.htm.
98 See 67 Fed. Reg. 54, 878, 54,878-905 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
99 See8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6) (2005).
100 See id. § 1003.1(e) (4).
101 See id. § 1003.1(d) (3) ("The Board will not engage in de novo review of findings of
fact determined by an immigration judge."); Gallagher, supra note 90, at 2-3 ("The length
of time that cases are pending before the Board will . .. be reduced.").
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to a monthly average of 4,600 cases in the first five months of fiscal
year (FY) 2003.102
The August 2002 regulations also reduced the size of the BIA by
over half; it now has only eleven members. 10 3 Some critics have con-
tended that the reduction was adopted at least in part so that the At-
torney General could remove BIA members whom he considered too
liberal.' 0 4 Others have charged that streamlining and the pressure to
dispose of cases have prevented proper consideration of appeals from
immigration judge decisions. 10 5 What is clear is that the number of
cases that noncitizens filed in court to review BIA decisions grew dra-
matically. For example, in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
number of immigration appeals filed by noncitizens not subject to the
judicial review bars leapt from about 900 in 1999 to more than 5,000
in 2004.106 One empirical study identifies as a possible cause the pri-
vate immigration bar's loss of confidence in the BIA decision making
as a result of streamlining. 10 7 It can only add to the inclination to seek
court review that the percentage of published BIA decisions reversed
by the Ninth Circuit climbed from about thirty in 2001, the last full
year before streamlining, to almost sixty-five in the first nine months
of 2005. The Ninth Circuit also reversed about twenty-five percent of
BIA affirmances without opinion, which are supposedly cases in which
the correctness of the original immigration judge's decision is
clear. 10 8 With BIA decision making so streamlined that not only im-
migration lawyers but also federal judges see it as deeply troubled, 10 9
the second direct review model casts habeas in the federal district
courts as a surrogate for the agency review that has largely disap-
peared since 2002.
102 See David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act Reorganization:
An Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 578 (2003).
103 See8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a) (1).
104 See Eric Lichtblau & Lisa Getter, Seeking Speedier Deportations, Ashcroft Plans Judicial
Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A11.
105 See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO, RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS To IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 39-41 (July 22, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA8mgPDF.pdf.; Lisa Getter
&Jonathan Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at
Al; Lichtblau & Getter, supra note 104.
106 SeeJohn R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many
People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis
of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review 85-93 (Cornell Legal Studies Research, Working
Paper No. 05-022, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=785824.
107 Id,
108 See Howard Mintz, Legal Fightfor Refugee, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2005, at
IA.
109 See, e.g., lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing disturbing
features of the immigration judge's handling of the case, and noting that these features
were representative of the recent immigration cases that the court had reviewed).
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C. Collateral Review Models
My two collateral review models treat habeas corpus not as a layer
of direct review, but as a different type of check on an immigration
judge's removal order. A federal district judge sitting in habeas in an
immigration case might think of her role as that of a judge deciding a
criminal habeas petition. The typical criminal case includes a state or
federal trial court conviction, followed by one or two layers of review
in state or federal appellate courts. Thus, in the criminal context,
habeas corpus assumes that prior, direct appellate review of the con-
viction has already taken place in multiple courts. Habeas then may
separately reexamine some aspects of the conviction.
Or, in the second collateral review model, a federal districtjudge
sitting in habeas might think of her role as a reprise of a feature of
pre-1996 immigration law-namely, pre-AEDPA section 106(a) (10) of
the INA's authorization that "any alien held in custody pursuant to an
order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas
corpus proceedings."'110 From 1961 to 1996, noncitizens could chal-
lenge deportation orders by filing petitions for review in the federal
courts of appeals. This made habeas jurisdiction under section
106(a) (10) into collateral review, in that it existed alongside federal
court of appeals review of deportation orders.
To eliminate one source of possible confusion, I should explain
that my distinction between these two collateral review models is not a
functional distinction, like the distinction between the two direct re-
view models based on the nature of habeas surrogacy. Instead, my two
collateral review models reflect two bodies of law-criminal habeas
and immigration habeas under old section 106(a) (10)-that federal
district judges might have had in mind in hearing a habeas petition
challenging a removal order. In this sense, one might alternatively
think of my two collateral review models as only one collateral review
model, but with two sets of illustrations in practice. If a judge has
either of these two collateral review models in mind, they will guide
his decisions about the scope and standard of review as well as other
procedural aspects of immigration habeas.
III
USING THE MODELS To UNDERSTAND THE CASES
A. Preclusion
These four models provide a way of understanding why judges
reach many of their decisions about the contours of habeas corpus in
immigration cases. As one example, an express or implied choice
110 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1995), repealed by IIRIRA, supra note 1, § 309, 110 Stat.
3009-546, 3009-626 to -627.
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among these models can explain ajudge's decision on the application
of preclusion rules. Consider the 2004 decision of the Ninth Circuit
in Nunes v. Ashcrofi.t ' The case involved a final removal order against
Jose Francisco Nunes, a citizen of Portugal, who was deportable be-
cause of his first-degree burglary conviction. 12 The immigration
judge's ruling that first-degree burglary constituted an aggravated fel-
ony had a number of negative consequences, including a bar to court
of appeals review and ineligibility for most forms of discretionary
relief.113
Nunes filed a pro se petition for review in the court of appeals,
which the court dismissed without explanation. 1 4 He then filed a
habeas petition in district court, which was also quickly dismissed.
1 15
Nunes moved for reconsideration, arguing that his burglary did not
rise to the level of an aggravated felony.116 The district court denied
the motion on the grounds that Nunes had "'fail[ed] to present new
evidence, to identify a change in controlling law, or to identify any
clear error.' t1 1 7 Then, acting for the first time with a lawyer, Nunes
appealed the denial of his motion for reconsideration.",, A court of
appeals panel affirmed the denial.' 19 It agreed with Nunes that the
bars to court of appeals review of criminal deportability do not apply
to habeas petitions. 120 It reasoned, however, that the court of ap-
peals's earlier dismissal of Nunes's petition for review must have been
based on the finding that his burglary conviction was an aggravated
felony, and that this finding precluded Nunes from arguing in his
habeas action that the conviction was not an aggravated felony.
1 2 1
M1 375 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (2005).
112 Id. at 812 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
113 See id.; INA § 101(a) (43) (G), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) (G) (2000) (defining as an
"aggravated felony" any burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least one
year); INA § 242(a) (2) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) ("Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law.. . , no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against
an alien who is removable by reason of having committed [any one of the] criminal of-
fense[s enumerated in specified sections]."). For ineligibility for discretionary relief, see,
e.g., INA § 240A(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (3).
114 Nunes, 375 F.3d at 812 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. (alteration in original).
118 Id.
119 Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The district court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied Nunes' motion for reconsideration. Nunes failed to
introduce new evidence, show a change in controlling law, or show that the district court
committed clear error when it dismissed his habeas petition."), amended and superseded by
375 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1395.
120 Id. at 819-20 ("It should be noted that our dismissal of Nunes' appeal on direct
review does not by itself render habeas review unavailable to Nunes. It is well-established in
this circuit that the statutory habeas remedy available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 survived the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of IIRIRA.").
121 Id. at 819.
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Phrased more generally, the question in Nunes was whether pre-
clusion applies in immigration habeas. Judge Tashima, joined by
Judge Reinhardt, dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. Ar-
guing that preclusion should not apply, Tashima wrote: "[T] he panel
opinion is wrong and contrary to binding precedent in treating dis-
missals of petitions for review for lack ofjurisdiction as barring further
litigation of the same claims on habeas."1 22 He continued: "[S]trict
res judicata does not apply in habeas proceedings." 123 Revealingly,
Judge Tashima drew on precedents involving habeas corpus in crimi-
nal cases. He first cited the 1995 Supreme Court decision in Schlup v.
Delo, which involved an inmate who claimed innocence and filed a
habeas petition to contest his murder conviction and death sen-
tence. 124 The key language in Schlup is the following: "This Court has
consistently relied on the equitable nature of habeas corpus to pre-
clude application of strict rules of res judicata."' 25 The core of
Tashima's thinking is captured in his reliance on an earlier Ninth Cir-
cuit decision, Calderon v. United States District Court, which he cited as
"rejecting the use of res judicata in a habeas proceeding 'because it
contravenes the longstanding rule that resjudicata has no application
in habeas corpus."'126 The passage in Calderon on which Tashima re-
lied went on to explain: "The entire point of a habeas petition that
challenges a state conviction is to relitigate issues that were raised in
the state case and resolved against the petitioner."127
It is clear both from Judge Tashima's reliance on criminal habeas
precedents and his insistence that strict preclusion does not apply that
he was adopting a collateral review model of habeas corpus regarding
the issue of whether Nunes's burglary conviction was an aggravated
felony. It is, as Tashima said, central to criminal habeas that federal
district courts not be bound in full measure by preclusion doc-
trines.1 28 This freedom from preclusion is precisely what creates the
relitigation and delay that have led to some discomfort with habeas
corpus in criminal cases. 129 Judge Tashima was right in characterizing
habeas review as collateral review of the aggravated felony issue. That
issue had been taken to the court of appeals, which had jurisdiction,
and decided there. He was arguing that any further review on habeas
corpus was collateral review as to the aggravated felony issue. The
122 Nunes, 375 F.3d at 813 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
123 Id.
124 See id.; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301 (1995).
125 Schlup, 513 U.S. at 319.
126 Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 163 F.3d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)), abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538
U.S. 202 (2003); see Nunes, 375 F.3d at 814 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
127 See Calderon, 163 F.3d at 537.
128 See Nunes, 375 F.3d at 813-14 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
129 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Ninth Circuit majority, by rejecting a rehearing en banc, concluded
that the circumstances did not warrant the extraordinary review that
collateral review entails. 31
This characterization of habeas review as collateral review applied
only to the aggravated felony issue and not to all issues that Nunes
might have raised in support of his habeas petition in federal district
court. Assume, for example, that Nunes had argued in his habeas pe-
tition that his aggravated felony conviction did not bar him from cer-
tain forms of relief from removal. Once it was decided that his
burglary conviction was an aggravated felony, section 242(a) (2) (C) of
the INA would have kept the issue of eligibility for discretionary relief
out of the court of appeals. 131 From that point onward, any habeas
review of the eligibility issue would be direct review. Preclusion would
not apply, but not because of Tashima's characterization of collateral
review in criminal habeas. Rather, preclusion would not apply be-
cause preclusion never applies to successive steps in direct review. In
short, a judge who adopts a direct review model of habeas corpus will
examine prior findings in a case without regard to preclusion. In con-
trast, a judge who adopts a collateral review model of habeas corpus
should assume that strict preclusion does not apply, but that reexami-
nation is more limited than it would be on direct review.
B. Stays of Removal
Another key issue in recent immigration cases is the availability of
a stay of removal while a court reviews a final removal order. Direct
review models of habeas corpus suggest that stays of removal should
not be extraordinary, but rather should be issued as necessary to pre-
serve the efficacy of direct review. As between the two direct review
models, it makes a difference for granting stays whether a federal dis-
trict court adopts the court of appeals direct review model or the BIA
direct review model. While stays in the federal courts of appeals are
not extraordinary, they also are not automatic-most courts of ap-
peals decide on stays by applying some version of the traditional stan-
dards for an injunction. 132 A district judge sitting in habeas with the
130 See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded by
375 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (2005).
131 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A movant seeking a
stay of deportation must show (1) 'some' likelihood that her petition for review will suc-
ceed on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm will occur if the stay is denied; (3) that the
potential harm to the movant outweighs the harm the INS will suffer if a stay is granted;
and (4) that a stay serves the public interest."); Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 687-89 (6th
Cir. 2001); Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 483 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). But see Weng
v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 287 F.3d 1335, 1337-40 (lth Cir. 2002) (holding that section
242(f) (2) of the INA bars courts of appeals from issuing stays of removal pending appeal
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that removal is prohibited as a matter of law).
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court of appeals direct review model in mind would likely adopt the
same approach.1
33
A district judge who adopts the BIA direct review model, how-
ever, may grant stays more readily, emulating the BIA's practice of
issuing automatic stays while BIA review is pending. 13 4 This is a sensi-
ble difference between BIA and court of appeals practices, and in turn
between the two direct review models. The court of appeals direct
review model presupposes that two layers of agency decision mak-
ing-the immigration judge and the BIA-have occurred. The BIA
direct review model can presuppose only one layer of agency decision
making-the immigration judge. Moreover, it is far more likely that a
noncitizen will proceed without counsel before an immigration judge
than before the BIA. Thus, it is logical to have an automatic stay
pending habeas review if a judge adopts the BIA direct review model.
In contrast, a federal district judge who thinks of immigration
habeas as collateral review, and therefore as extraordinary review, will
be more cautious or even hostile when it comes to stays of removal
orders.1 35 Professor Nancy Morawetz has documented the Western
District of Louisiana's practice of denying stays of removal in habeas
cases and even of vacating stays that other federal district courts have
issued in the same case. t 36 The Western District's stated rationale for
denying and vacating stays relies on section 242(g) of the INA, which
seems to eliminate federal court jurisdiction "to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders."'
37
In criticizing this practice, Professor Morawetz observed that not
even the government has urged this reading of section 24 2 (g).13 8 She
also noted that these decisions support this reading of section 24 2(g)
by citing cases in which habeas was used not to challenge removal
orders, but rather to raise separate matters-such as a temporary stay
of removal-without challenging removal itself.' 39 It is highly re-
133 See, e.g., Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 285 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that section
2 4 2(g) of the INA does not eliminate a federal district court's power to stay a removal
while a habeas petition is pending).
134 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (2005).
135 The interjurisdictional conflict between the original state conviction and federal
habeas corpus might give a federal district court sitting in habeas pause about issuing a
stay, particularly in cases where the court has adopted the first collateral review model of
immigration habeas, in which immigration habeas is analogized to criminal habeas.
1-36 See Nancy Morawetz, Detention Decisions and Access to Habeas Corpus for Immigrants
Facing Deportation, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 18-30 (2005).
137 See id. at 18; INA § 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 125 2 (g) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
109-102, 2005).
138 See Morawetz, supra note 136, at 23.
139 See id. at 24.
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vealing that these decisions seem to see no meaningful difference be-
tween habeas challenges to removal orders and habeas petitions that
raise such separate matters. The habeas model at work here is one in
which all immigration habeas concerns separate matters, hence always
involves collateral review. This rationale may not ultimately be persua-
sive, and in fact the Fifth Circuit's May 2005 decision in Tesfamichael v.
Gonzales would seem to have ended the Western District's practice by
announcing a more lenient standard for stays of removal.' 40 But the
collateral review model still explains why the district judges in the
Western District of Louisiana could read section 24 2(g) as depriving
them of jurisdiction to issue stays of removal. Again, my point is not
that these decisions are right or wrong but that different models of
habeas corpus can explain how judges could reach different results.
C. Remedies
Another issue in the context of immigration habeas is what reme-
dies are available from a federal district court sitting in habeas to re-
view a final removal order. Here, too, it matters whether federal
courts think of habeas corpus as direct or collateral review. A good
example is found in a case that Professor Morawetz discussed in her
analysis of stays of removal-the 2004 Fifth Circuit decision in
Zalawadia v. Ashcroft.141 Jaysukh Zalawadia filed a habeas petition to
challenge the lawfulness of his removal order. While the petition was
pending, he was removed to India.142 When the district court dis-
missed his petition, 143 Zalawadia appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which
considered two issues: First, did Zalawadia's removal deprive the dis-
trict court of jurisdiction to decide his habeas petition? 44 If not, and
if the removal was unlawful, what remedies were available after the
removal? 
45
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court still had jurisdiction
after the removal and that the removal order was unlawful, but that its
remedies were limited to vacating the defective order. 146 The court
held that it lacked the authority to give Zalawadia the further remedy
that he sought-a remand to the BIA with instructions to hold a new
removal proceeding to consider Zalawadia's application for discre-
tionary relief.14
7
140 See 411 F.3d 169, 171-76 (5th Cir. 2005).
141 371 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2004); see Morawetz, supra note 136, at 30-31.
142 Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 294.
'43 Id. at 295.
44 Id. at 296-97.
'45 Id. at 298.




The Fifth Circuit justified this conclusion by analyzing immigra-
tion habeas in terms that closely track my four models of habeas
corpus. The panel explained: "This case is not the direct appeal of the
BLA's decision, in which we could review the full scope of Zalawadia's
claims and order the BIA to correct its mistakes."' 48 The panel relied
heavily on its view that the Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr treated
habeas corpus as distinct from direct review.' 49 Deferring until Part
IV my reasons for believing that Zalawadia misread St. Cyr, it is impor-
tant to understand how the view of habeas as collateral review in
Zalawadia shaped the court's analysis and ultimately led to its refusal
to remand to the BIA. Addressing remedies, the court continued:
"[H]abeas specifically is not a tool that can be broadly employed to
restore the habeas petitioner to his or her status quo ante beyond free-
ing him from the restraints on liberty arising directly from the illegal
order or judgment."'150 The Zalawadia court's reasoning shows that a
judge who views immigration habeas as collateral review, and there-
fore extraordinary, tends toward a more limited view of available
remedies.
In contrast, a direct review model of immigration habeas suggests
a more expansive view of remedies. A district court judge who sees
immigration habeas as direct review would go further toward putting a
noncitizen who prevailed in a removal order challenge in the same
position as he would have been if the government had never initiated
removal proceedings in the first place. Such a judge would be more
willing to declare the prior removal order to be null ab initio for pur-
poses of any criminal illegal reentry prosecution. 151 She would also be
more willing to give the wrongly removed noncitizen a discretionary
relief hearing-the very relief denied in Zalawadia-even though such
hearings are ordinarily available only to persons in the United
States. 152 Moreover, a direct review model suggests that the inadmissi-
bility grounds based on unlawful presence in the United States, which
are triggered only if a noncitizen leaves, 153 should not apply if an un-
lawful removal order was the reason for departure. A direct review
model also suggests that the government should pay to bring the
noncitizen back to the United States, since that is what is required to
148 Id. at 298.
149 Id. at 299-300.
150 Id. at 300.
151 See INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 109-102, 2005)
(describing the class of aliens subject to criminal penalties for reentering the United States
after removal).
152 See Zalawadia, 371 F.3d at 296.
153 See INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (establishing that aliens who
were unlawfully present in the United States for specified lengths of time and who seek




return the noncitizen to the same position as he would have been in if
the government had never tried to remove him. I am not suggesting
that a court sitting in habeas to review a removal order should always
grant these remedies, but I believe that a judge adopting a direct re-
view model would be much more inclined to do so.
D. Other Issues
There are many other examples of how a judge's choice between
the direct and collateral review models will influence how she answers
key questions regarding the contours of her jurisdiction to review re-
moval orders. I will mention only a few to reinforce the point that a
judge's assumed model of immigration habeas matters a great deal.
Location and proper respondent. Where is the proper location of a
habeas challenge to a final removal order? Ajudge who views habeas
as direct rather than collateral review would assume a closer tie be-
tween the location of the challenge and the location of the removal
proceeding before the immigration judge or the BIA review. By simi-
lar reasoning, a direct review model of immigration habeas would also
suggest that the respondent should be the Attorney General, whose
Executive Office for Immigration Review issued the removal order.
The two collateral review models, however, suggest that there
should be a closer connection between the location of the challenge
and the actual location of physical confinement. By definition, collat-
eral review is separate-in time, for example-from the procedure
that resulted in the removal order. Since the purpose of collateral
review is to reexamine separately, there is less reason under a collat-
eral review model than under a direct review model to tie venue to the
original proceeding. Under a collateral review model, it becomes
more logical to argue that habeas must be filed where the noncitizen
is physically confined. This is the relevance to immigration habeas of
the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, which held
that "in habeas challenges to present physical confinement-'core
challenges'-the default rule is that the proper respondent is the war-
den of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney
General or some other remote supervisory official." 154 The Court dis-
tinguished cases not involving immediate physical custody-which de-
scribes many habeas challenges to final removal orders.155 It becomes
more logical to argue that habeas must be filed where the noncitizen
is physically confined.
Departure from the United States. Different habeas models also give
different answers to the question of how the nature of the noncitizen's
departure from the United States affects habeas jurisdiction. Such de-
154 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004).
155 Id. at 435 n.8.
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parture might be involuntary or voluntary, and ranges from formal
removal to departure under varying degrees of government influence
or coercion. Since the 1960s, it has been well settled that a final re-
moval order against a noncitizen satisfies the threshold requirement
that he be "in custody" before he may file a habeas petition. 1 56 It is
also well settled that the departure of a noncitizen who has filed a
habeas petition challenging a final removal order does not deprive
the court of jurisdiction.157 Put more generally, the in-custody re-
quirement must be satisfied only at the time the petition is filed.
158 If
a noncitizen leaves the United States before filing a habeas petition,
however, the general rule says that it is too late to do so because the
noncitizen will no longer be able to satisfy the in-custody
requirement.
15 9
Both direct review models cast habeas as a normal part of the
chain of review. If the purpose of review is to provide an ordinary
check on the immigration judge's initial decision, then the argument
is stronger that a noncitizen's physical location at any point in the
habeas action is irrelevant to jurisdiction. If, however, immigration
habeas is collateral, and therefore extraordinary review, it may be rea-
sonable to devote resources to the most active cases-i.e., those in
which noncitizens are about to be removed-because these are the
cases in which judicial intervention will have the most practical im-
pact. Thus, a collateral review model may suggest requiring a nonci-
tizen to be in the United States when she files a habeas petition, and
even requiring that she remain in the United States while the court
adjudicates it.
Filing deadlines. The choice among habeas models will also affect
the timing of review, particularly as enforced by filing deadlines. The
court of appeals direct review model suggests imposing the same
thirty-day deadline as would apply to petitions for review in the court
of appeals. 160 The BIA direct review model also suggests a thirty-day
deadline, as this is the deadline that would apply to an appeal to the
156 See Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348-49 (1973);Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 240-43 (1963); Rosales v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 426
F.3d 733, 735 (5th Cir. 2005); Simmonds v. INS, 326 F.3d 351, 354-56 (2d Cir. 2003);
Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001); Mustata v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1021 n.4 (6th Cir. 1999); Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d
290, 293 nn.2-3 (9th Cir. 1995).
157 See Zegarra-Gomez v. INS, 314 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Leitao v. Reno, 311
F.3d 453, 455-56 (1st Cir. 2002); Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 428 (4th Cir. 2002);
Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 382 (3d Cir. 2001); Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d
194, 196 (5th Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 533 U.S. 945 (2001).
158 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234,
237-38 (1968).
159 See, e.g., Patel v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 334 F.3d 1259, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2003).
160 See INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2000).
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BIA. 16 1 But ajudge who adopts the BIA direct review model might be
more willing to consider the likelihood that a noncitizen will not be
represented by counsel before the immigration judge and the possibil-
ity that the noncitizen could not reasonably have been expected to file
by the deadline; such ajudge might also be inclined more generally to
take into account the fact that the BIA would be the first layer of re-
view from an immigration judge's decision. These factors might lead
a federal district judge who adopted the BIA direct review model to
find that any such deadline is subject to equitable tolling for good
cause in the same way that the deadline for motions to reopen may be
equitably tolled. 162 Such ajudge might alternatively order the BIA to
reissue the decision so that the thirty-day clock would restart, 6 not-
withstanding pre-REAL ID Act case law saying that the thirty-day
deadline is jurisdictional and therefore may not be equitably tolled.1
64
The court of appeals direct review model suggests a less flexible atti-
tude toward the thirty-day deadline, recognizing that the very nature
of direct review requires that it end within a reasonable time, even if it
affords fuller review while it is available. In contrast to the court of
appeals direct review model, but somewhat more like the BIA direct
review model, the collateral review models of immigration habeas
tend to tolerate habeas filings well beyond the thirty-day deadline,
even if the collateral review that takes place is more limited.
Exhaustion of remedies. A final issue to mention is the requirement
that noncitizens exhaust administrative remedies before seeking court
review. As a general matter, both direct and collateral review models
suggest that exhaustion should be required. It is well settled in crimi-
nal habeas that petitioners must exhaust state remedies before filing a
federal habeas petition. 165 This criminal law requirement is usually
explained as a matter of comity and deference to state courts. 16 6 A
federal court's collateral review of federal agency action involves simi-
lar considerations: preserving agency authority and promoting judi-
cial efficiency. 16 7 The basic idea is to give the first decision-making
161 See8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.3(a)(1), 1003.38(b), 1240.15, 1240.53(a) (2005).
162 See, e.g., Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490-91 (7th Cir. 2005); Harchenko v.
INS, 379 F.3d 405, 409-10 (6th Cir. 2004); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.
2002); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1188-90 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Iavorski
v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2000).
163 See, e.g., Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2000).
164 See, e.g., Malvoisin v. INS, 268 F.3d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2001).
165 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 250-53 (1886).
166 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 76, at 883-84; LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS
499-502 (2d ed. 2003).
167 See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185, 194 (1969) ("And since agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature
or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that
discretion or to apply that expertise. And of course it is generally more efficient for the
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process a chance to function correctly before allowing the extraordi-
nary intervention that is inherent in collateral review.
The direct review models of immigration habeas suggest the same
result, but they pose more complex issues. A federal district judge
who adopts the court of appeals direct review model would probably
require exhaustion. Petitions for review in the courts of appeals ex-
pressly require exhaustion under section 242(d) of the INA, which
provides in pertinent part that "[a] court may review a final order of
removal only if ... the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies
available to the alien as of right."'168 Under the BIA direct review
model, however, a federal districtjudge sitting in habeas may be more
willing to waive exhaustion or recognize that it is futile, just as the BIA
might when acting as the first layer of review of an immigration judge
decision. At that stage of direct review, it is more likely that the re-
cord has been made with less experienced counsel or without any
counsel at all. The same considerations that suggest flexibility with
regard to deadlines may suggest a similar attitude toward exhaustion
of remedies.
IV
MODELS Or HABEAs CORPUS AND THE REAL ID ACT
Thus far, I have shown that my four habeas models can illuminate
the outcomes and reasoning in the body of case law defining immigra-
tion habeas since 1996. The two remaining questions, which this Part
addresses, are: (1) Which model makes the most sense, and (2) which
model did the Supreme Court endorse in INS v. St. Cyr? But first, I
need to explain the sweeping changes that occurred in May 2005 with
the REAL ID Act. This Part may then address those two questions,
and finally explore the implications of the four models of immigration
habeas for court review of final removal orders after the REAL ID Act.
A. The REAL ID Act
When the REAL ID Act became law on May 11, 2005, it amended
section 242 of the INA and thus revised the current system of court
review of immigration decisions. 169 The Act established petitions for
review in the courts of appeals as the principal vehicle for court review
of final removal orders and certain other immigration decisions by the
administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to
seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages.").
168 INA § 242(d) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1) (2000); see Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d
51, 56-63 (2d Cir. 2003). See generally Nancy Morawetz, Practicing Defensively: Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies, in IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY HANDBOOK 2005-06 EDITION 1033
(2005).
169 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310-11
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 109-102, 2005)).
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government. 170 The Act did this by making it clear-or at least
clearer than Congress had been in 1996-that the various provisions
that had previously eliminated judicial review also eliminated habeas
corpus jurisdiction, mandamus jurisdiction, and jurisdiction under
the All Writs Act.' 17 The REAL ID Act expressly mentioned that these
forms ofjurisdiction no longer existed for review of removal orders,
7 2
though habeas corpus seemed to remain intact for certain issues, in-
cluding detention issues and damage claims based on violations of
constitutional rights, that are "independent of challenges to removal
orders."
173
This apparent elimination of habeas corpus to challenge removal
orders responded to INS v. St. Cyr by enacting the explicit abrogation
of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 that the Supreme Court in St. Cyrfound lacking in
section 242 of the INA as enacted by IIRIRA. At the same time, Con-
gress largely eliminated the judicial review bars that had originally
prompted noncitizens to file habeas corpus petitions in federal district
courts to challenge removal orders. The REAL ID Act did this by ad-
ding section 242(a) (2) (D) of the INA, which provides:
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision
of this Act (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judi-
cial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section. 1
7 4
170 Id. § 106(a)(1)(B), 119 Stat. at 310-11.
171 See id. This Article does not discuss sections § 106(c) and (d) of the REAL ID Act,
which addressed some but not all of the transitional issues concerning habeas petitions
pending on the date of enactment.
172 Thus, section 242(a) (5) of the INA provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory),
including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas
corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for
review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order
of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act, except as pro-
vided in subsection (e). For purposes of this Act, in every provision that
limits or eliminates judicial review or jurisdiction to review, the terms "judi-
cial review" and 'jurisdiction to review" include habeas corpus review pursu-
ant to section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas
corpus provision, sections 1361 and 1651 of such tide, and review pursuant
to any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory).
Id.
173 H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 300; see
Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 42, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2005); Sissoko v. Rocha, 412 F.3d
1021, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005).
174 § 106(a) (1) (A) (iii), 119 Stat. at 310. For cases holding that section 242(a)(2)(D)
allows review of questions of law, see Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir.
2005); Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2005); Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonza-
les, 410 F.3d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 2005). For a case holding that section 242(a) (2) (D) allows
review of constitutional claims, see Ramos v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 2005).
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It is hard to speak of any real legislative history of the REAL ID
Act, since it was passed by dispensing with committee process, sus-
pending the rules on the floor, and attaching it to an urgent appropri-
ations bill. But there is a Conference Report, which portrays the
judicial review provisions of the Act as a congressional effort to over-
haul a flawed system. A major concern focused on the noncitizens
who had been the targets of the judicial review bars in AEDPA and
IIRIRA. These noncitizens-whom AEDPA and IIRIRA seemed to
give less access to courts to review removal orders-actually had more
layers of access as a result of INS v. St. Cyr and the prior decisions of
like-minded courts of appeals. The noncitizens who were subject to
the judicial review bars could now first file a habeas petition in district
court and then, if unsuccessful there, appeal to a court of appeals. 
75
Other noncitizens with removal orders had to go straight to a court of
appeals. Moreover, the system was confusing, sending some issues to
the court of appeals on a petition for review and sending other issues
in the same case to a district court on habeas. 176 For example, any
deportability issue in St. Cyr could have gone to the court of ap-
peals, 17 7 but the issue of eligibility for discretionary relief had to go to
the federal district court on habeas. According to the Conference Re-
port, the REAL ID Act responded "[b]y channeling review to the
courts of appeals. 
'178
As courts interpret the various provisions of the REAL ID Act in
the coming years, much attention will be devoted to two broad areas
of inquiry: (1) what sort of review is now available in the courts of
appeals, and (2) whether and what sort of habeas corpus jurisdiction
remains. The experience with habeas corpus in the decade from 1996
to 2005-and in particular an evaluation of immigration habeas dur-
ing this period in terms of the four models I have sketched-will help
to answer these key questions about review of removal orders after the
REAL ID Act. As a threshold matter, however, it is important to assess
immigration habeas from 1996 to 2005 without regard to the changes
wrought by the REAL ID Act.
B. Assessing Collateral Review and Direct Review Models
Part III illustrated that the decisions that shape habeas jurisdic-
tion can best be understood as reflecting tension and choice among
175 See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 173.
176 Id. at 174.
177 The question of whether St. Cyr was deportable, and if so, on what ground, needed
to be resolved before the judicial review bars in section 242(a) (2) (C) would apply. For
cases recognizing such jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction, see, e.g., Drakes v. Zimski, 240
F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001); Tapia Garcia v. I.N.S., 237 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001);
Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 2000).
178 H.R. REp. No. 109-72, at 174.
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four models of habeas corpus. The resulting body of decisions has
not coalesced into a coherent and consistent set of rules for review of
removal orders. But the most disturbing aspect of immigration
habeas jurisprudence between 1996 and 2005 is not its inconsistency.
Rather, it is the fact that too many decisions adopt a collateral review
model. These decisions include the Fifth Circuit's view of remedies in
Zalawadia 79 and the general policy toward stays in the Western Dis-
trict of Louisiana.
80
One source of potential confusion is the close association be-
tween immigration law and criminal law. It has been well settled since
the Supreme Court's 1893 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States
that deportation is civil and not criminal in nature. 8" Removal, how-
ever, involves the same sort of custody that is inherent in and is the
prerequisite for criminal law habeas jurisdiction. 18 2 Moreover, the
stakes involved in removal from the United States are one of the fun-
damental premises for collateral review, as Part II explained. The ac-
cepted view of criminal habeas as collateral review, combined with a
focus on the stakes involved in a noncitizen's removal, make it natural
to think of immigration habeas, like criminal habeas, as a form of col-
lateral review as well.
In fact, however, the only way to preserve habeas corpus as a guar-
antee against unlawful detention in the immigration setting is gener-
ally to think of habeas review as a form of direct review. Collateral
review models are appropriate in the criminal law context only be-
cause habeas operates after a complete system of trial and appellate
courts hear a case-typically a judicial trial and at least one layer of
direct appellate review. The other collateral review model, immigra-
tion habeas to review deportation orders under former section
106(a) (10) of the INA, operated during the period before 1996, when
as a general rule noncitizens could challenge deportation orders by
filing petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals.' 83 Because
collateral review presupposes either direct review or a valid decision to
eliminate it, collateral review models are appropriate in immigration
law only when such prior court review has occurred. This was the case
in Nunes, with the court of appeals's prior finding that Jose Francisco
Nunes had been convicted of an aggravated felony.'8 4 A direct review
model is more appropriate, however, in cases where no such prior
court review has taken place, as was common in immigration law from
179 Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 299-301 (5th Cir. 2004).
180 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
181 See 149 U.S. 698, 709, 730 (1893).
182 See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27, 110.
184 See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded by
375 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (2005).
20061
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
1996 to 2005. Before Enrico St. Cyr filed his habeas petition, for ex-
ample, no court had reviewed the BIA's finding that he was ineligible
for discretionary relief.'
8 5
These differences between the reality of immigration habeas and
the two collateral review models explain why the Supreme Court deci-
sion in INS v. St. Cyr'86 is best understood as endorsing a direct review
model of immigration habeas. Here I return to the Fifth Circuit deci-
sion in Zalawadia v. Ashcroft,18 7 which gives the wrong answer to the
question of whether the St. Cyr Court saw immigration habeas review
of final removal orders as direct or collateral review. The Fifth Circuit
panel distinguished habeas review from direct review and evidently
concluded that habeas review must therefore be a form of collateral
review. The court appeared to rely on St. Cyr, but in so doing it funda-
mentally misread the Supreme Court's analysis. 188
St. Cyr distinguished habeas review from judicial review-a dis-
tinction that was necessary for the Court to conclude that Congress's
drafting of section 242 of the INA to eliminate judicial review (via
petitions for review in the courts of appeals) left intact habeas review
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the federal district courts. But the Court
never used the word "direct" to describe whatjudicial review is, or, by
implication, what habeas review is not. More affirmatively, the Court
emphasized that eliminating habeas corpus in immigration cases
could completely eliminate the involvement of any courts. 18 9 On this
basis, the Court distinguished criminal habeas from Enrico St. Cyr's
day in court: "[T] his case involves an alien subject to a federal removal
order rather than a person confined pursuant to a state-court
conviction."' 90
After setting out these basic ideas, the Court adopted a broad
reading of the scope and standard of review in immigration habeas
that belies any characterization of habeas review of a final removal
order as collateral in the sense that criminal habeas is collateral. The
Court emphasized: "At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus
has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention,
185 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297 (2001).
186 See id.
187 371 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2004).
188 Other courts may have made the same mistake in interpreting St. Cyr to reject di-
rect review. See, e.g., Antunez-Obregon v. Gonzales, No. 04-9529, 2005 "AIL 2328612, at *3
(10th Cir. Sept. 23, 2005) ("In St. Cyr, direct review of the removal order was statutorily
barred, but the Supreme Court held that the statutory language did not abrogate habeas
corpus review . . ").
189 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 300 ("A construction of the amendments at issue that would





and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest." 91
To be sure, the Court acknowledged that "the scope of review on
habeas is considerably more limited than on APA-style review."' 192 But
immigration habeas, according to the Court, includes examination of
questions of law involved with the removal order, as well as review to
ascertain that "some evidence" supports any factual determina-
tions' 93-- a standard of review like the standard that typically applies
to direct appellate review of factual determinations in trial courts. In
other words, while the Supreme Court distinguished habeas review
from judicial review, it adopted a version of habeas review that has key
features of direct review. It also avoided narrower readings of habeas
that might have, for example, limited review to preventing "funda-
mental miscarriages of justice."'
9 4
In short, the St. Cyr Court recognized habeas corpus review as a
more ordinary, direct form of review of removal orders, because doing
so avoided the serious constitutional doubts that would arise if nonci-
tizens had no opportunity to test the lawfulness of a final removal or-
der in some court. In other words, as long as the Suspension Clause
preserves habeas corpus as a guarantee against unlawful detention,
only viewing immigration habeas as direct review can give real mean-
ing to that guarantee. And treating immigration habeas as collateral
review can, as shown by Zalawadia and the stay practices in the West-
ern District of Louisiana, rob that guarantee of meaning.
C. The Models and the BIA
Having established that the immigration habeas is best under-
stood as a form of direct rather than collateral review, and also that
the Supreme Court endorsed this view of immigration habeas in St.
Cyr, the next issue is the choice between the two direct review models.
Both respond to recent developments since 1996. The first model-
191 Id. at 301; see also id. at 301 n.14 ("At common law, '[w]hile habeas review of a court
judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdictional competency, an
attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of the detention.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1038, 1238 (1970))).
192 Id. at 314 n.38; see id. at 311-12 (citing Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 236
(1953)).
193 Id. at 302 ("[T]he issuance of the writ was not limited to challenges to the jurisdic-
tion of the custodian, but encompassed detentions based on errors of law, including the
erroneous application or interpretation of statutes."); id. at 306 (describing the immigra-
tion habeas jurisdiction thus: "[0] ther than the question whether there was some evidence
to support the order, the courts generally did not review factual determinations made by
the Executive. However, they did review the Executive's legal determinations." (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted)).
194 See, e.g., Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996) ("[T]he Constitution
requires only that the writ of habeas corpus extend to those situations in which the peti-
tioner's deportation would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.").
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immigration habeas as a surrogate for review in the courts of ap-
peals-responds to the judicial review bars in section 242 of the INA.
The second model-immigration habeas as a surrogate for BIA re-
view-responds to the drastic reduction in review of removal orders
by the BIA.
Viewing the choice strictly as a matter of constitutional require-
ments might favor an argument for the court of appeals direct review
model. The argument that the Constitution requires some access to
courts to test the lawfulness of removing a person from the United
States is stronger than the argument that the Constitution requires a
second layer of agency review either by the BIA or a BIA surrogate.
Moreover, courts have uniformly held that BIA affirmances without
opinion and other aspects of BIA streamlining do not violate due pro-
cess. 19 5 Nothing in the Constitution compels a federal district court
sitting in habeas to view itself as a BIA surrogate as opposed to a court
of appeals surrogate.
Policy considerations, however, favor the BIA direct review model
over the court of appeals direct review model. While the availability of
habeas jurisdiction in the federal district courts filled the void created
by the judicial review bars in section 242 of the INA, the absence of
meaningful BIA review became just as significant. Even without con-
sidering the dramatic increase in efforts to get court review discussed
in Part 11,196 more basic is the fact that by the time the REAL ID Act
became law in May 2005, approximately one-third of BIA appeals were
resulting in affirmances without opinion. 97 This means that the im-
migration judge's opinion in these cases became the final statement
of agency reasoning for purposes of court review. 198 Under these cir-
cumstances, it has become reasonable for district court judges sitting
in habeas to take seriously their new role as the first layer of review of
removal orders issued by immigration judges, and to think of them-
selves as substituting not for the courts of appeals, but for the BIA.
Of course, federal district court judges-even those who took the
BIA direct review model to heart-could not function entirely like the
BIA, because they are not part of the administrative agency authorized
by Congress to interpret and enforce the federal immigration laws.
195 See, e.g., Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2003);
Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375-79 (1st Cir. 2003). But cf Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d
917, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (remanding the case to the BIA, because affirmance without opin-
ion prevented the court from deciding jurisdiction when one ground for the BIA's deci-
sion would eliminate jurisdiction, while another ground would allow jurisdiction).
196 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
197 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, BIA RE-
STRUCTURING AND STREAMLINING PROCEDURES (rev. 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/BLAStreamlining120804.pdf.
198 See, e.g., Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005); Desta v. Ashcroft,
365 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Their decisions are not given the deference to reasonable agency in-
terpretations of law that the BIA frequently merits under Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.199 The question,
however, is not whether immigration habeas can duplicate BIA review,
but whether federal judges shape immigration habeas mindful that
they are acting for the BIA.
D. Lessons from the Four Models for the REAL ID Act
Why does the choice of a direct review model of immigration
habeas, and more specifically a BIA direct review model, matter after
the REAL ID Act? After all, the Act repeals immigration habeas, or at
least it seems to do so. In a nutshell, my answer is that the choice
among the four models matters because understanding (1) that immi-
gration habeas in the decade from 1996 to 2005, especially in St. Cyr,
generally adopted (and should have adopted) a direct review model,
and (2) that as between the two direct review models the BIA version
better responds to changes in the agency decision making that courts
are set up to review, helps answer two key questions: (1) What will
review of final removal orders by way of petitions for review in the
federal courts of appeals look like after the REAL ID Act?; and (2)
what will any surviving habeas corpus jurisdiction to review final re-
moval orders look like after the REAL ID Act? With respect to both of
these questions, the danger is that the answers will be influenced too
strongly by a collateral review model of immigration habeas.
For petitions for review after the REAL ID Act, the danger is that
some courts will adopt a begrudging reading of new section
242(a) (2) (D) of the INA. The false logic that could lead to this read-
ing would go something like this: (1) St. Cyr rejected direct review and
adopted collateral review, and therefore (2) courts should look to
criminal habeas (as practiced in recent years, not the Warren Court's
fuller version) as they shape immigration habeas after the REAL ID
Act. This reading of new section 242(a) (2) (D) would then assume
(1) that the grant of jurisdiction to review "constitutional claims or
questions of law" permits only the review that had taken place in im-
migration habeas before the REAL ID Act became law, and (2) that
the contours of such immigration habeas should be defined in light of
a collateral review model of immigration habeas.
As for the first of these propositions, some courts of appeals seem
to have said that the REAL ID Act, by adding section 242(a) (2) (D) of
the INA, only granted them via petitions for review the same jurisdic-
tion, and nothing more, that had previously been available in habeas
199 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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in the federal district courts. 20 0 According to the Conference Report,
"The purpose of [section 242(a) (2) (D)] is to permit judicial review
over those issues that were historically reviewable on habeas."20 This
view of the relationship between pre-REAL ID Act habeas corpus and
post-REAL ID Act petitions for review by noncitizens who are subject
to the criminal bar in section 242 (a) (2) (C) draws support from sec-
tion 242(a) (2) (D), which limits review to "constitutional claims and
questions of law." Such noncitizens do not get court of appeals review
of purely discretionary or factual determinations. 20 2 This limitation
reinforces any intuition to define petitions for review by these individ-
uals after the REAL ID Act by reference to habeas corpus before the
REAL ID Act.
Even if petitions for review adopt at least as broad a scope and
standard of review for the direct review model of immigration habeas
as that which the Supreme Court adopted in St. Cyr, there is still the
danger that other attributes of petitions for review will erroneously
reflect a collateral review model. It is important that the return of
review to the courts of appeals avoid these dangers and ameliorate the
negative consequences of changes at the BIA level. This assumes, of
course, that the BIA changes are not reversed. Better would be a res-
toration of BIA review, which would eliminate the need that I identify
for the BIA direct review model of immigration habeas. In this sense,
the need for courts to adopt the BIA direct review model of immigra-
tion habeas is a way of understanding the real institutional costs of
BIA streamlining and its logical consequences.
As along as the BIA fails to conduct meaningful review in a large
number of cases, however, courts of appeals should absorb the ap-
proaches developed by the federal district judges who have
adopted the BIA direct review model. Applying the analysis in Part
III, this would mean that they (1) should not apply preclusion doc-
trines to issues not yet heard by any court, (2) should consider them-
selves authorized to grant a broad range of remedies to undo the
effects of unlawful removal orders, and (3) should issue stays of re-
moval as if they were the BIA. There are also implications for the
other issues briefly discussed at the end of Part III: the location of a
200 See Kamara v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 420 F.3d 202, 210-11 (3d Cir.
2005) ("A review for 'constitutional claims or questions of law,' . .. mirrors our previously
enunciated standard of review over an alien's habeas petition." (citation omitted)).
201 See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 300.
202 See Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2005); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
766, 768 (7th Cir. 2005); Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 ("[W]hile the reforms in section 106 would preclude
criminals from obtaining review over non-constitutional, non-legal claims, it would not
change the scope of review that criminal aliens currently receive, because habeas review




habeas challenge, the effect of a noncitizen's departure from the
United States, the timing of review, and the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies-as well as other matters.
Admittedly, my reasoning contains this apparent paradox: I am
using St. Cyr-understood in light of my four models of habeas
corpus-as the principal guide for petitions for review after the REAL
ID Act. Yet, as Part IV.A explained, a principal purpose of the Act was
to repudiate St. Cyr.20 3 But this paradox is more apparent than genu-
ine. While the REAL ID Act repudiated St. Cyrs channeling of immi-
gration cases into the federal district courts via habeas, the Act did
nothing to repudiate or even question the basic lessons of St. Cyr
about the substance of court review in immigration cases-that some
court review of final removal orders is required, and that in immigra-
tion cases such court review is direct review.
Beyond the lessons of pre-REAL ID Act immigration habeas for
petitions for review after the REAL ID Act, there is also the possibility
of habeas jurisdiction that survives the Act, even with the Act's appar-
ent repeal of immigration habeas. In this regard, the key question is
this: What is the constitutionally adequate substitute for habeas
corpus in the context of court review of final removal orders? Again,
it is important for courts to remember that the legislative history of
the REAL ID Act indicates Congress's intent to maintain habeas re-
view as the Supreme Court defined it in St. Cyr, and that St. Cyr
adopted a direct review model of immigration habeas. In implement-
ing the REAL ID Act, the courts of appeals can interpret the scope
and standard of review as well as other features of petitions for review
in ways that appropriately reflect a direct review model as it emerged
before the REAL ID Act. If the courts of appeals do so, Congress will
have succeeded in providing a constitutionally adequate substitute for,
and thus have justified repealing, habeas corpus jurisdiction to review
final removal orders. 20 4 But if courts shape petitions for review in be-
grudging ways that reflect a collateral review model of immigration
habeas, Suspension Clause problems will arise, and habeas jurisdiction
to review final removal orders will remain as a matter of constitutional
command.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 174-78.
204 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381
(1977); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 ("By placing all review in the courts of appeals,
Division B would provide an 'adequate and effective' alternative to habeas corpus.").
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